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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to delineate an empirically grounded, structure-causal going concern 
recursive model of UK economics that, in the context of the RAE and local department decision-
making, explains the progressive elimination of heterodox economics, the progressive 
homogenization of mainstream economics from 1992 to the present, and the continued rise to 
dominance of a select group of departments, and indicates whether these ‘regularities’ will 
continue under the Research Excellence Framework selectivity exercise in 2014. 
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THE UK RESEARCH ASSESSMENT EXERCISE AND THE NARROWING OF  
UK ECONOMICS
1
 
1. Introduction 
 Prior to 1986, funding for research in British universities was built into the state’s funding 
allocation for higher education pro-rated (at different rates) to universities based on student 
numbers.  This was based on the assumption that all lecturers and professors were engaged 
in research and scholarship as part of their role as academics.  Additional funds for specific 
research projects were available upon successful applications to the various research 
councils, such as the Social Science Research Council (1965-1983) and its successor 
the Economics and Social Research Council (1983-present). In the 1960s, the Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Council for Scientific Policy began advocating for 
funding selectivity.  By 1970 the Science Research Council recognized that demand for funds 
for research began exceeding the amount that was going to be available; so it implemented 
policies of selectivity and concentration in order to sustain viable research groups.  At the 
same time, the University Grants Committee (UGC) found that the government’s grant for 
the funding of teaching and research in British universities was declining in real terms. 
Moreover, in the early 1980s, the universities became victims to heavy cuts in public expenditure 
and it became apparent to many administrators in the field that ‘excellence in research’ could 
not be maintained without applying some principle of selectivity in funding (in conjunction with 
the closure of low-grade departments). Somewhat reluctantly, therefore, the UGC (supported by 
the Royal Society, the British Academy, and the vice-chancellors from the leading research 
universities) agreed to a research selectivity exercise (RSE) whereby research funds were 
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank Grazia Ietto-Gillies and Jamie Morgan for their comments on a previous 
draft of this paper.  The usual caveat applies. 
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distributed to different departments according to the UGC's assessment of their degree of 
excellence. The first exercise in 1986 was an ad hoc affair with the allocation of about 16.5 percent 
of the research monies dependent on the research ratings of departments. The second RSE 
was carried out by the UGC in 1989 with the allocation of about 50 percent of research 
funding dependent on the ratings of duly constituted subject panels to whom departments 
submited more refined applications; and in 1992, its successor, the Universities Funding 
Council (UFC), carried out a third exercise, now named the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE).  
In 1992 (as well as in the subsequent 1996, 2001, and 2008 RAEs), over 90 percent of the UFC's 
research funds were distributed by its successors, the Higher Education Funding Councils 
(HEFCs) for England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, according to the ratings of its 
subject panels; and the pre-1992 ‘old’ universities had to compete for that money with the new 
universities (qua ex-polytechnics and other similar higher education institutions) (Williams, 
1993;  Kogan and Hanney, 2000; Tapper and Salter, 2003; Bence and Oppenheim, 2005; Martin 
and Whitley, 2010; Morris, 2010).  
The negative impact of the 1992, 1996, and 2001 UK research assessment exercises on 
heterodox economics is well documented (Harley and Lee 1997; Lee and Harley 1998; Lee 
2007); and as will be shown below, the 2008 RAE reinforced the efforts of the last two decades 
to free British economics of economists and their theories that exist beyond the pale, outside of 
the society of decent, respectable economists.  The elimination of heterodox economics occurred 
at the same time that the concentration and homogenization of economic research and the 
dissemination of economic ideas of a elite group of economic departments took place.  Although 
these three discipline events or outcomes are distinct, their simultaneous occurrence suggests the 
existence of an underlying common causal mechanism.  Richard Whitley suggests that the 
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common mechanism is grounded in the combination of a strong RSE and powerful disciplinary 
elite.  A strong RSE is one that “…institutionalize public assessments of the quality of the 
research conducted in individual departments and universities by scientific elites on a regular 
basis according to highly formalized rules and procedures” (Whitley, 2007, p. 9).  The peer 
review-based assessments are then used to generate discipline-based quality research (QR) rating 
of departments, which in turn have a significant impact on state funding and hence on the 
research activities of the assessed departments.  A powerful disciplinary elite is one that can 
influence the organization and direction of the RSE to favor their conception of research quality, 
objectives and goals of research, appropriate research methods, and discipline qua professional 
values.  When combined, the RSE is captured so that it not only replicates the disciplinary elite 
and its research agenda and values, it does so in a mutually reinforcing or cumulative causation 
manner so that the disciplinary elite becoming progressively more powerful and its research 
agenda and values increasingly dominate, leading to a decline in the variability in research goals 
and approaches and disciplinary diversity and pluralism.  Economics, Whitely suggests, is a 
prime example of RAE regulatory capture (Whitley, 2007; Martin and Whitley, 2010, p. 66).  
Whitley based his claim on the work I carried out (with Sandra Harley) over the past two 
decades on economics and the 1992, 1996, 2001 RAEs (Harley and Lee, 1997; Lee and Harley, 
1998; and Lee, 2007).  I argued that the Royal Economics Society (RES) did capture the RAE 
panel appointment process, thereby ensuring that the economics and econometrics panel 
(hereafter economics panel) consisted of assessors that represented its research interests and 
disciplinary values.  However, this initial capture was not done in the interest of an disciplinary 
elite, but in the name of a specific economic theory, neoclassical or mainstream theory.  Once 
captured, the values and interests represented by the RES became increasingly significant in the 
6 
 
economics and econometrics panel’s peer-review assessing of research quality and, hence, in 
determining departments’ research quality ratings.  In this context, the categorization of journals 
as mainstream or heterodox along with journal rankings was introduced to help assessment 
outcomes; but the recursive relationship between the RAE, the economics panel, and journal 
rankings qua ‘right kind of journals’ leading to the increasing dominance of a single ‘right way’ 
of economic theorizing and conducting economic research is underdeveloped.  Moreover, the 
RES-capture of the RAE qua economics panel is not sufficient in itself to entirely account for 
three ongoing events that characterize UK economics:   (1) the ostracizing of heterodox 
economics, (2) the concentration and homogenization of UK economic research from 1992 to the 
present, and (3) the dissemination of economic ideas of an elite group of UK economic 
departments.  As going concerns, economic departments also have their own causal role in these 
three events through their hiring and promotion practices, directing research, identifying the right 
(world class) journals in which to publish research, deciding what material to teach 
undergraduate and post-graduate students, and the training of research students; and all of these 
intentional activities affect their RAE rating qua funding which in turn affects the continuation 
(or not) of these activities.  In short, there are three causal mechanisms that account for the 
simultaneous ongoing of the three discipline events:  one being regulatory capture identified by 
Whitley, the second being the economics panel in its assessment of research quality, and the 
third being local department ‘going concern’ decision making.  Moreover, the three causal 
mechanism are recursively connected, reinforcing each other, and operate in the context of 
various structures to generate (in a cumulative causation, transfactual, demi-regular manner) the 
above three events.  Thus Whitley’s claim and my analysis of the RAE are only partially correct.   
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The aim of this paper is to delineate an empirically grounded, structure-causal going 
concern recursive model of UK economics that, in the context of the RAE and local department 
decision-making, explains the above noted discipline events and indicates whether these 
‘regularities’ will continue under the Research Excellence Framework (REF) selectivity exercise 
in 2014.
2
  In the next section, the going concern model is set out and explained.  The third 
section deals with the cumulative modification of the structure of UK economics with regard to 
the concentrate of quality research (QR) funding in a few universities, the values and perceptions 
of the ‘right’ journals, and the concentration of research and first degree students in the elite and 
near-elite departments.  The fourth section delineates the causal mechanisms—departments, 
RES-CHUDE, and the economics panel—and their decisions and outputs. The fifth section 
details the economic events that are generated by the structures and causal mechanisms. The 
sixth and concluding section considers whether the event regularities will continue with the 2014 
REF selectivity exercise.  
2. Going Concern Model of UK Economics 
The concept of the going concern refers to any organization with continuity of activity 
and an indefinite life span (as opposed to a organization with a specific life-span).  For a UK 
economics department to be a going concern, it is necessary to keep its productive research 
capabilities intact and even enhance them; and this requires maintaining if not increasing the 
flow of QR monies which is dependent on its QR rating that in turn depends on its research 
capabilities.  For a department to exist as a going concern, UK economics itself also has to be a 
going concern; that is, it must also have ‘managerial’ capabilities and working rules that enable it 
to have expectations of a future, by which is meant an inflow of QR monies to its constituent 
                                                          
2
 A similar model (but without the details) has been developed by Donald Gillies (2012). 
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departments to ensure that they remain going concerns.  Thus the going concern model of UK 
economics—see Figure 1—consists of three causal mechanisms, going concern departments, the 
RES which provides discipline-level managerial capabilities, and the RAE economics panel 
which utilizes the discipline’s accepted working rules in assessing research quality.  The causal 
mechanisms operate in the context of three distinct structures, the structure of state funding of 
research, the structure of UK economics (which consists of three sub-structures), and the 
RAE.  The causal mechanisms make five decisions that produce four outputs:  publications 
and staffing composition of economic departments, the economics panel (which is also a 
causal mechanism), and department QR ratings.  All of the causal mechanisms, structures, 
decisions, and outputs are real and hence measurable, quantifiable, and/or observable , thus 
capable of empirical grounding. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The starting point of the model is the structure of state funding.  The state provides 
funds for research (and teaching) to the UFC/HEFCs which utilize the RAE department QR 
ratings to distribute the funds to the various universities who in turn direct those funds to 
their various departments.  Individual economic departments have no say in the state’s 
process of the allocation of research funds and little say within their  own universities.  As a 
going concern, the economics department makes decisions and takes initiatives to maintain 
if not increase its capabilities for receiving future QR funds.  Two of its three decisions, 
research-journal decisions and hiring decisions, are affected by its own values and 
perceptions of what are the top economic journals and the right kind of research, and by the  
three structures of UK economics which the department can only indirectly affect:  the 
current research funding structure of UK economics; the values and perceptions of what are 
9 
 
the top economic journals and the appropriate economic theories and applied economics to 
teach students; and the structure and composition of undergraduate and post-graduate 
research students.  Thus, the research-journal decisions generate an array of research outputs 
that are published in a diverse set of outlets.  These publications embody the ideas, theories, 
and methodologies by which the department is identified.  Similarly, the department’s hiring 
decisions are made, in part to meet undergraduate and post-graduate teaching needs, but 
more importantly to improve its research and publication capabilities.  Thus, the hiring 
decisions affect the theoretical composition of the department in terms of staffing and 
diversity of theories, ideas, and research.  The outcome of the interplay between the 
decisions that produced the publications and the department’s staffing composition is a 
three-part impact on heterodox economics, economic research, and the significance of 
individual economics departments. 
 The department’s QR funding is dependent on the publications it submits to the 
RAE.  As an organizational structure, the RAE transmits the publications to its economic 
panel of assessors.  However, to select the assessors, the RAE involves the RES which turns 
to its standing committee, Conference of Heads of University Departments in Economics 
(CHUDE) to assist it in making recommendations to the RES.  Thus, a department’s third 
decision is to become active in CHUDE so to influence the RES decisions regarding the 
selection and recommendation of panel assessors who will determine their QR funding 
allocation.  Thus, the structural values and perceptions of UK economics in combination 
with the departments’ values and perceptions are transmitted to the economics panel’s 
selection process; and, along with the values and perceptions of the RES, they are used in 
the selection of the assessors for the panel.  In turn, the economics panel assesses the QR of 
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the publications submitted by the various economics departments and the research quality 
rating of its output that is then used by the UFC/HEFCs to allocate research funds to 
universities qua economics departments.  If the economics panel appears to denote 
particular research-publications qua publication outlets as being top in research quality, then 
going concern departments will use that judgment to make future research and hiring 
decisions to produce output that will appear in those outlets.  This recursive, slowly 
cumulative transformative structure-causal process means that over the RAEs departments 
make ‘stronger’ decisions concerning, appropriate economic research, publications qua 
publishing outlets, and hiring of economists, thus contributing to the aforementioned 
discipline events.   
 To establish that the going concern model of UK economics actually accounts for the 
discipline events, it is necessary to empirically ground the historical evolution of its 
structures, causal mechanisms, decisions, and outputs.  However, given the complexity of 
the task due to the different QR funding decisions taken by the HEFCs, the paper will 
restrict the empirical grounding of the model to England as a close approximation for UK 
economics.  This is not at all inappropriate since, of all UK higher education institutions, the 
ones in England account for over 85 percent of the student population, QR funding, and 
research active staff.  Moreover, in 2008, the number of RAE active economics departments 
in Northern Ireland was zero, in Wales one, in Scotland six, and in England 28 or 80 percent 
of all research active department.  Thus England clearly dominates UK economics.  
3. Structures of UK Economics    
 The structures of UK economics provide the historical framework in which economic 
departments make their hiring and research-journal decisions and their decisions regarding 
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their involvement with CHUDE and, hence, the RES.  But these decisions also have an 
impact on the structures.  Therefore, over the past four assessment exercises, these 
structures have slowly changed so as reinforce the discipline events. 
3.1 Structure and Concentration of Quality Research Funding  
 In light of the selectivity rationale for the RAE, the HEFC for England developed a 
ranking system for research quality and corresponding funding weights that increasingly 
emphasized international excellence—see Appendix I.3  As a result, over the last two 
decades, national excellence in research quality has gone from being quite important in 
terms of funding to being completely unimportant, while international excellence has gone 
from being quite important to being the only criterion relevant for research funding.  This, 
in turn, ensured that QR funding became increasingly concentrated in and among fewer 
economics departments.
4
  That is, in 1992, there were 71 universities (and other institutions 
of higher education) that had first degrees (BA/BS) in economics and/or post graduate 
students; but only 46 submitted research to the 1992 economics panel, of which 42 received 
QR funding.
5
  In 1996, there were 74 universities with economic students but only 38 
submitted research to the 1996 economics panel of which 35 received QR funding; for the 
2001 RAE there were 70 universities with economic students but only 33 submitted research 
                                                          
3
 The Appendices referred to in the paper can be obtained from the author or found at 
http://cas.umkc.edu/economics/people/facultyPages/lee/default.asp.   
4
 Strictly speaking, universities received the research funds awarded by the HEFCs; and they can 
distribute them as they wish.  Since a university’s submission to a RAE subject panel, such as 
economics, was usually based on the fact that it actually had a department of economics, the 
department received much if not all the funding it earned.  Thus, for the paper, a university’s 
RAE submission to the economics panel is treated as a submission made by its economic 
department. 
5
 Buckingham College of Higher Education (now Buckingham New University) did not have any 
degree-seeking students in economics, but still made a submission to the 1992 RAE for its two 
economists (derived from economics student enrollment data supplied by the Higher Education 
Statistical Agency) – contact the author for details. 
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to the 2001 economics panel and 24 received QR funding;
6
 and for the 2008 RAE there were 
69 universities with economic students but only 28 submitted research to the 2008 
economics panel and all received QR funding—see Appendices II and V.   
So, over the course of the four RAEs, the percentage of universities receiving QR 
funding for economics declined by 30 percent—see Table 1.  Moreover, the composition of 
the universities submitting to the RAE economics panels changed significantly in favor of 
departments from the ‘old universities’.  That is, in the 1992 RAE, twelve new universities 
made submissions to the economics panel.  Four of the departments received a QR rating of 
one which gave them no QR funding; while seven received a research rating of two and one 
received a research rating of three which meant they received some research funding.  
However, for the 1996 RAE only eight new universities made submissions to the economics 
panel, for the 2001 RAE only four, and for 2008 RAE only three—see Appendix III.  The 
total amount of QR funding for the twelve new universities for 1993-94 to 1996-97 totaled 
£1,631,006, which was just 3.2 percent of the QR funding for economics for that period.  
That percentage dropped to 2.7 for 1997-98 to 2001-02, to 0.1 percent for 2002-03 to 2008-
09, and then nudged upward to 0.6 percent for 2009-10 to 2012-13.  Thus, the participation 
of the new universities in the RAE in economics declined by 75 percent and its allocation of 
QR funding declined from almost nothing to virtually nothing.  In addition, the top three 
research rated categories increased their share of the QR funds from 96.2 percent to nearly 
one hundred percent—see Table 1.  Lastly, the funding per staff, per year for the QR funded 
categories varied over the four RAEs, increasing from a ratio between the highest and 
lowest funded categories of 4.3 to 5.1 in the 1996 RAE, but then declining to 4.0 after the 
                                                          
6
 The eight universities with a research rating of 3a received QR funding for only 2002-03; thus I 
have classified them as not receiving QR funding. 
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2001 RAE when the QR funding was restricted to research ratings of 4 and higher, and 
finally increasing to 5.6 for the 2008 RAE.  As a result, the overall structure of QR funding 
became increasingly structured to favor economics departments at the old universities, to 
favor qua QR fund only 24-25 (or maybe 28) economics departments, and to restrict the 
upward migration of rated departments and the inward migration of non-rated departments 
so to increasingly favor in funding a smaller select group, that is 4-5 elite departments or 
perhaps circa 13 elite and near-elite departments, within a relatively stable number of 25-28 
departments—see Table 2.  
[Table 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
3.2 Values and Perceptions 
All academic disciplines and professions have a multi-element set (or structure) of 
values and perceptions that help define what it is to its members and to others, such as 
external evaluators.  They are distinct from the values and perceptions held by economics 
departments and individual economists (which can differ to some degree) in that if a 
department or academic ceased to exist, they would continue and be mostly unaffected.  
Their existence is significant in that they are causally efficacious when causal mechanisms 
make decisions to generate particular outcomes.  In particular, the values and perceptions of 
UK economics relevant to its modeling are the research quality ordering of economic 
journals and the appropriate economic theories and applied economics to be taught to 
undergraduate and post-graduate students.  The discipline perceptions and values regarding 
journals and what is the ‘right’ kind of economics to be promoted and taught to students 
affect the decisions made by departments, the RES, and the economics panels; and the more 
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dominant they are, the more likely the department, the RES, and the economics panel will 
make mutually compatible decisions. 
3.2.1 Journals   
For the 1986 RSE, each department was asked to submit their five best publications 
from which its overall research quality was deduced.  However, for the 1989 RSE and the 
1992 RAE up to two publications from each full-time member of the faculty were 
submitted; and then for the 1996, 2001, and 2008 RAEs up to four publications from 
research active faculty was requested.  This meant that each department submitted many 
more research publications upon which it would be judged; hence it became important to 
consider what publications should be submitted in light of how the economics panel would 
assess them.  However, relying on what is perceived as the profession’s view of what are the 
top research quality journals helps to reduce this uncertainty.  In particular, UK economists 
widely believed that the 1989 economics panel drew upon Diamond’s (1989) list of 27 core 
economics journals in assessing the submissions.  This perception increased with the 1992 
RAE and subsequent exercises (Harley and Lee, 1997; Lee and Harley, 1998; and Lee, 
2007).  It is not difficult to discern why Diamond’s list of 27 journals obtained such an 
elevated status among UK economists: those journals appeared repeatedly as top quality 
journals in journal ranking studies and in articles that used ‘professional judgment’   journals 
to identify the top, blue ribbon, or ‘everyone would agree are core, mainstream, highly 
respected, quality’ journals prior to 1989 and since 1989 up to the present day (Lee, 2006; 
Schneider and Ursprung, 2008; Ritzberger, 2008; Da Silva 2009; Halkos and Nickolaos, 
2011; Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos, 2011); and they appeared to be sanctioned by 
Economics and Social Research Council, the RES, and CHUDE since they represented 16 of 
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the 22 high impact journals identified in their jointly sponsored study, International 
Benchmarking Review of UK Economics (ESRC, 2008).   
Moreover, the department QR ratings outcomes over the four RAEs have 
significantly reinforced the perception that Diamond List (DL) publications matters.  That 
is, as shown in Table 3 the correlation between the proportion of DL articles in the 
department’s total submissions and the department’s QR rating was high enough to make 
the perception a ‘fact’ upon which to act.  As a result, the proportion of DL journals in all 
submissions increased from 18 percent in 1992 to 39 percent in 2008; while the proportion 
of DL journals in all journal submissions increased from 31 percent to 44 percent.  Finally, 
the perceived importance of DL journals has a corollary perception:  that only journal 
submissions (and certainly not chapters in edited volumes and authored books) matter to the 
economics panel when assessing research quality, the outcome of which resulted in the 
shifting of the percentage of journal articles in all submission from 53 percent in 1992 to 91 
percent in 2008.  In short, the perceived significance of DL journals for obtaining a high QR 
department rating has increased over time to the point that they are nearly seen as the only 
relevant journals in which to publish.
7
  
 [Table 3 about here] 
3.2.2 Subject Benchmarking and Subject Reviews 
 The perception of what constitutes the ‘right kind of economics’ that should be 
taught to students is a deeply held value by UK economists.  So what is taught as economics 
is a ‘value’ that contributes to the self-held definition of what it means to be a ‘good’ 
economist, as opposed to a ‘bad’ economist or no economist at all (in spite of having a 
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 Marginal variations of the ‘top’ quality mainstream economic journals are possible; but the 
majority of such journals will also be DL journals. 
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doctorate in economics).  This self-defining value is not just specific to an individual 
economist, but is also a ‘structured’ value for economics as a whole, as captured and 
represented in my 1994 and 2003 surveys of UK economists, by the 2000 and 2007 subject 
benchmarking statements, and by the 2000-01 subject reviews carried out by the Quality 
Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA).
8
  In the 1994 survey of British economists, 
only ten of the elite and near-elite departments included something other than mainstream 
economics in the aims and objectives of their courses and only 15 of the other 42 
departments in the survey did as well.  In the QAA 2000-01 economic subject review, 
departments had a free-hand in specifying the aims and objectives of their first degree 
programs in economics; hence it was possible to have aims and objectives that included 
knowledge about alternative qua heterodox economic theory and economic policies.  
However, none of the elite and near-elite departments had something other than mainstream 
economics in the aims and objectives of their degree programs, while only 14 of the other 
43 departments in the review did.  So within a six year period there was a perceptible 
increase in the perceived value of mainstream economics: the elite and near-elite 
departments entertain no other view while two-thirds of the other departments endorse this 
position.  This was evident in the QAA’s ‘act of uniformity’, the economic benchmark 
statement issued in 2000 (and in the 2007 revision).  The statement, as noted in Lee (2007: 
314), essentially enshrined “neoclassical economic theory as the only economic theory to 
teach undergraduate students and the only theory they are expected to know,” much like the 
                                                          
8
 The 2000 economics benchmark statement is only available from QAA, but it is virtually the 
same as the 2007 economics benchmark statement:  
http://www.qaa.ac.uk/Publications/InformationAndGuidance/Pages/Subject-benchmark-
statement-Economics.aspx.  The QAA economics subject reviews are also only available from 
the QAA.  Finally, for the questionnaire surveys, see Harley and Lee 1997, Lee and Harley 
1998, and Lee 2009B: Appendix A.20 and A.23.      
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1662 Act of Uniformity prescribing how all acts of public worship should be conducted.
9
 
Finally, the 2003 survey combined with the evidence in Lee (2007) reinforces the 
dominance of this value by showing that departments which had only mainstream 
economists on staff essentially taught their students exclusively mainstream economics, 
while departments that had some heterodox economists on staff did not hold such a 
restricted view of what should be taught.  So in the end, the perception that a ‘good’ 
economist is one that radiates mainstream theory which is considered the only ‘good’  
economic theory that students should be exposed to became more powerful and dominate 
over the four RAEs.   
3.3 Structure of Undergraduate and Post-Graduate Students 
 The structure of the undergraduate and post-graduate research student population has 
changed over the four RAEs, but in ways that maintain if not reinforce the dominance of the 
elite and near-elite departments.  In the early to middle 1990s, many polytechnics became 
universities and hence were able to give doctoral (and undergraduate) degrees.
10
  
Consequently, as an increasing number of universities were able to have research students 
combined with an increase in financial support, their numbers increased from approximately 
1,700 in 1994-95 to nearly 1,900 in 2006-07, but then dropped by 36 percent to nearly 1,200 
in 2010-11.  Over this time period, the proportion of universities in the top two research 
rated categories (the elite and near-elite departments) relative to the total number of 
                                                          
9
 It has been pointed out that the group which drafted the 2000 benchmark statement included 
some heterodox economists and intended the statement to be inclusive and not proscriptive.  
However, in representations to the QAA Benchmarking Committee for Economics and  CHUDE, 
the Association for Heterodox Economics argued that the statement as written appears to 
enshrine a single view of economics and hence is proscriptive with regard to heterodox 
economics (Freeman, 2006; CHUDE Minutes 9 February 2008, 1 November 2008). 
10
 Prior to 1992, polytechnics could not give undergraduate, masters, and doctoral degrees, but 
had to award them via the Council for National Academic Awards. 
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universities that taught economics remained relatively stable around 19 percent and their 
portion of post-graduate research students remained relatively stable at around 53 percent.  
On the other hand, the portion of non-research rated universities in the total population 
increased in jumps from 35 percent in 1994-95 to 59 percent in 2010-11 while their 
proportion of research students first increased by 150 percent to 20 percent of the research 
students in 2003-04 and then slowly declined to 17 percent in 2010-11—see Table 4 and 
Appendix V.  So, in spite of the boom-bust cycle of the number of research students, the 
dominance of the top departments and the reputations of their doctoral programs remained 
unchallenged by the lesser and non-research rated departments. 
 The first degree student population increased nearly continuously over the four 
RAEs, from 17,610 in 1994-95 to 24,480 in 2010-11 or by 39 percent.  However, the growth 
in student numbers for the elite and near-elite departments grew by nearly 44 percent, so 
that their share of total first degree student population increased from 36.6 to 37.9 percent.  
Similarly, the growth in student numbers combined with the increased in the number of non-
research rated departments resulted in a hundred percent increase in first degree students at 
non-research rated departments, so that their share increased from 22.6 to 32.8 percent—see 
Table 4.  Consequently, the ‘middling’ research rated departments experienced as a group 
no growth in student numbers.  Moreover, there was a subtle change in the institutional 
make-up of the students.  In 1994-95, four ex-polytechnics were among the ten largest 
departments in terms of student numbers; by 2002-03 it had dropped to one; and in 2010-11 
there were none.  In addition, the number of first degree students at  the 29 ex-polytechnics 
qua new universities and other institutions of higher education declined from 6,270 in 1994-
95 to 4,565 in 2010-11 or by 28 percent (as total student numbers increased by 39 percent); 
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and eight of the 29 institutions
11
 teaching students in 1994-95 had ceased doing so by 2010-
11 (which was compensated by seven new institutions teaching economics).   Thus, the 
outcome of the growth of the number of first degree students were to reinforce and augment 
the dominance and reputation of the elite and near-elite departments and to concentration 
the teaching of economics among the ‘old’ universities.  So overall, the structure of the 
research and first degree student populations evolved in a manner that reinforced the 
dominance of the elite and near-elite departments.  
[Table 4 about here] 
4. Causal Mechanisms and Their Decisions and Outputs 
 Given structures, a causal mechanism generates causal outcomes.  The mechanism 
itself is a well-defined entity that has a stable internal organization whose components are 
intentionally related; and has the capability to act and the power to generate outcomes.  
Thus, the causal mechanism takes on the persona of the acting person within the context of a 
going concern organization.  The significance of this is that the acting person qua causal 
mechanism is reflexive in terms of its decisions and thus visualizes the possible impact of 
its actions; and it can determine the extent to which its decisions qua actions achieve the 
desired outcomes.  The going concern-causal mechanisms that drive UK economics and 
generate the discipline events that we are interested in are the economics department, RES-
CHUDE, and the RAE economics panel. 
4.1 Departments:  Publications and Composition 
 The economics department, as a going concern, is a well-defined organization in 
terms of its faculty, teaching, research, and administrative qua decision-making activities.  
                                                          
11
 Initially there were 30 institutions, but a merger between the University of North London and 
London Guildhall University creating London Metropolitan reduced the number to 29. 
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While the decision-making process can vary among economic departments, the decisions 
regarding hiring, promotion and research emphasis are generally collective undertakings; 
and perceptions of what constitutes research excellence hence good economics and good 
economists and world-class, internationally reputable, leading economic journals congeal 
into department positions.
12
  Thus, the research-journal and hiring-promotion decisions 
produce two outputs:  publications and the faculty composition of the department. 
 In terms of research, the interests of departments’ faculty generally span more than a 
few of the JEL areas classification codes.  However, after the 1992 RAE, departments 
realized that focusing a majority of their research in well-defined research areas was one 
component for maintaining as well as increasing their QR rating.  So decisions were made 
regarding research areas which resulted by 2008 in five core research areas constituting 
around 50 percent of all department research areas and in five important research areas 
constituting around 27 percent of all research areas—see Table 5.  Since research ratings 
were positively correlated with research in these two research areas and DL (and similar 
world-class) journals were excellent for the publications emanating from these areas, the 
issue of research management arose.  Research management involved directing and/or 
redirecting faculty research, targeting publications in DL, world-class journals, and basing 
hiring and promotion decisions on carrying out world-class research in the targeted areas 
and publishing in the DL journals.  Initially, the pressure intentionally placed on errant 
faculty was significant, but ultimately successful, in that they either complied or were 
transferred to other departments or left the university (Harley and Lee, 1997; Lee, 2008B, 
                                                          
12
 For example, the London School of Economics explicitly stated in its RAE 2008 submission 
(RA5a section) that it ‘specializes’ in mainstream economics and considers itself one of the best 
known universities in the world for work in this area.  Thus, 95 percent of its submissions were 
rated 4* or 3*, while 57 percent of its submissions were in DL journals. 
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Appendix 23).  So by 2001 and certainly by 2008 errant faculty ceased to exist in most 
departments—see Table 6.  So over time, the research-publishing-hiring intentionally 
regime adopted by going departments became increasingly focused on DL (and other world-
class) journals and on the exclusive qua restrictive hiring of mainstream economists who 
can produce DL publications—see Table 6.13  What made the different research areas hang 
together as a collegial, cohesive research endeavor, and hence their successful management 
by the departments possible, was the communality of methodology (such as the exclusive 
use of econometrics in all research activities) and exclusively working within the theoretical 
framework of mainstream economics (see for example the University of Liverpool 2001, 
University of Essex 2001 and 2008, London School of Economics 2008, Surrey 2008, and 
University College London 2008 RAE-RA5a: structure, environment and staffing policy 
submissions).       
[Table 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
 The outcome of the interactive process inherent in the research-publishing-hiring 
regime was, over the four RAEs, an increasing ‘mainstream’ composition of publications 
and the faculty.  As noted in Table 3, the percentage of DL articles of all submissions 
increased from 18 percent in 1992 to 39 percent in 2008, with some departments—such as 
LSE, UCL, Essex and Warwick—having more than 40 percent of their submissions 
appearing in DL journals (see Appendix IV).  Conversely, heterodox submissions declined 
                                                          
13
 In their RA5a  ‘Research Environment and Esteem section of  their 2001 and 2008 RAE 
submissions, four of the five elite class, six of the eight near-elite class, and nine of the twelve 
middle class departments explicitly identified particular DL journals (if not all of them) as world-
class, internationally top economic journals—see Appendix VI.  This emphasis in terms of 
publishing and hiring on a narrow range of journals is understandable when the financial 
sustainability of a going department is tied to publishing in them. 
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from 3.2 percent in 1992 to one percent in 2008 (with just eight, or 0.5 percent, coming 
from the elite or near-elite departments)—see Table 7 and Appendix VII.  Regarding 
departments’ mainstream vs. heterodox staff composition, the hiring patterns just after  the 
1992 RAE heavily favored mainstream economists who constituted over 80 percent of all 
hires (see Appendix IX).  In addition, from 1996 to 2012, the number of heterodox 
economists located in research-rated departments declined by 70 percent, while the number 
in non-research rated departments remained stable.  In fact, by 2012 nine of the 13 elite and 
near-elite departments had no heterodox economists on staff and two others had a total of 
four heterodox economists on staff, while the 12 middling departments had a total of eight 
heterodox economists on staff (see Appendix VIII).  On the other hand, the number of 
heterodox economists located in non-economics departments increased by nearly 240 
percent.  Moreover, 59 percent of the 68 economics departments (15 research-rated and 25 
non-research-rated) in 2012 had no heterodox economists on staff.  This represents a 40 
percent increase over the 28 departments (7 research-rated and 21 non-research-rated) who 
had no heterodox economists on staff for the entire time period, 1992/6 to 2012 (see Table 
7).   
The interactive process between research-publishing and hiring resulted in 
department-staff compositional change over the past two decades being positively willfully-
causally correlated with the concentration of scholarly work in the core research areas and 
with the increase in DL submissions and negatively causally correlated with the decline of 
non-mainstream research areas and with heterodox submissions to the economics RAE panel 
(see Tables 5 and 7).  It is also positively causally correlated with the number of heterodox 
economists who are located in non-economics departments and with the percentage increase 
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in heterodox RAE submissions outside of economics (see Table 7).   In short, the research-
publishing-hiring decisions intentionally pursued by economics departments over the past 
four RAEs has accomplished the goal of making the departments themselves more 
mainstream, with the side-effect that the departments (and hence UK economics) has 
become more intellectually and research-wise homogeneous. 
4.2 RES-CHUDE:  Economics Panel 
 The selection of the members of the economics panels has evolved slightly since the 
1989 RSE, with the core RES-CHUDE causal mechanism remaining relatively stable.  The 
RAE (through the chair of the economics panel which it appoints) looks mostly towards the 
Royal Economic Society to provide it with a list of names from which it can select for the 
panel.  In turn, the RES turns to its standing committee, Conference of Heads  of University 
Departments in Economics to solicit nominations from its members.  To enhance its going 
concern prospects, the economics departments need to have some input in who is appointed 
to the economics panel; hence they must decide (their third core decision, the other two 
concern hiring-promotion and research-publications) to become active in CHUDE.  From 
the nominations received, CHUDE via the RES forwards a select list of names to the chair 
of the panel for consideration. The panel chair, in consultation with CHUDE, also considers 
the nominations made by other learned and professional bodies.  From these two general 
‘inputs’, the chair creates the economics panel.  Thus, the ‘capturing’ of the RAE panel 
selection process involved the RES structuring it to its advantage (Lee and Harley 1998; 
CHUDE Minutes 5 April 2004, 13 November 2004). 
 The outcome of the RES-CHUDE selection process for the four RAEs is that the 
economists qua assessors had three characteristics, the first being a mainstream economist 
24 
 
(28 of the 30 economists selected, the two exceptions being Phillip Arestis and Meghnad 
Desai—see Appendix VIII).  A second common characteristic is that most of the assessors 
held significant positions in the RES, whether it be on the various RES committees, the 
managing/associate editor of the RES’s The Economic Journal, being a member of the 
RES’s CHUDE steering committee, and/or engaged in RES-CHUDE economics 
benchmarking projects (see Lee and Harley 1998: 42-44, and Table 8).  The third 
characteristic is that the assessors published more DL articles than the average economist:  
47 percent of the RAE 2001 assessors’ submissions were in DL journals whereas it was 28 
percent for all the 2001 RAE submissions, and the 2008 RAE, it was 53 percent vs. 39 
percent—see Tables 3 and 8.  Although not pervasive among the 2001 and 2008 assessors, 
being involved with a DL journal as an editor or associate editor (or similar fashion) was 
emerging as an important characteristic (and certainly became so for the 2014 REF 
assessors—see Table 8).  Thus, as a causal mechanism within the RAE, RES-CHUDE 
structured the selection process so that ‘internalized’ within the assessors were the values 
and perceptions that the RES and CHUDE (and the various UK economics departments that 
constitute CHUDE) consider most important:  conducting and publishing ‘international 
excellence’ research in DL journals and maintaining the dominance of mainstream 
economics in the UK economics profession. 
[Table 8 about here] 
4.3 Economics Panel:  Department Research Quality Ratings 
In peer-review assessment exercises, the peers are supposed to review all 
submissions.  This was possible in the 1986 RSE when each department submitted their five 
best publications from which its overall research quality was deduced.  However, with the 
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dramatic increase in the number of submissions for the 1989 RES and the 1992 RAE (up to 
two publications from each full-time member of the faculty) and for the 1996, 2001, and 
2008 RAEs (with up to four publications from each research active faculty), this meant that 
it was not really possible for the assessors to read every submission (in spite of some claims 
to do so—see Lee and Harley 1998: 32, 46 fn. 10).  And nor could they individually clearly 
discern the overall research profile of all the departments.  Thus, mechanisms were adopted 
to make the assessment possible, such as assigning individual assessors to examine the 
overall research profile of specific departments (which included more than just reading the 
submissions).  A second mechanism was to examine at least fifty percent of the submissions 
in detail.  Finally, the assessors met as a group to collectively arrive at the research ratings 
of each department that were comparable.  With these three mechanisms in place, it was 
possible for the economic assessors to carry out the assessment exercise and rate the 
research quality of each department in a consistent manner (Lee and Harley 1998; RAE 
Economics and Econometrics Panel ‘Overview Report’, 
http://www.rae.ac.uk/2001/overview/docs/UoA38.pdf; 2008 Economics and Econometrics 
Panel ‘Criteria and Working Methods’, http://www.rae.ac.uk/pubs/2006/01/docs/i34.pdf; 
Beath 2002).   
What made the convergence of assessors’ assessments possible was that they drew 
upon their commonly held values and perceptions on what was good economics and high 
quality economic research, and which journals had the greatest international reputations.  
This is not, however, to say that they substituted Diamond’s list of core economic journals 
for their judgment of a submission’s research quality.  However, the fact is that most 
assessors satisfied more than one of the following:  (1) published in DL journals (see Table 
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8), (2) agreed on the benchmark statement that defines what is economics and especially 
good economics (see Table 8), and (3) were members of Departments that (i) emphasis 
publishing in DL journals (see Table 6) or simply highlighted mostly if not only the DL 
journals in their RA5a submissions to the RAE (with a side note saying that the department 
would continue to publish in core journals),
14
 (ii) that in the 2001 and 2008 RAEs frequently 
identified DL journals as having international standing, the research ranking outcomes (see 
Appendix VI), and (iii) that based hiring and promotion near exclusively on publishing in 
DL journals (see Table 6).  So, it was as if Diamond’s list was the sole criterion for 
assessing submissions and arriving at a department’s research rating .  As noted in Table 3, 
with the best correlation coefficient being less than one, this was not entirely the case.   
What is evident, however, is that DL journals represent a concise set of research and 
disciplinary values that the assessors (and UK mainstream economists in general) support .  
So the assessors research rating decisions resulted in rewarding departments that publish in 
DL journals and hence engage in the core research areas which mainstream economists 
value.  
5. Discipline Events 
 With the going concern model of UK economics in place, it is now easily seen how 
and why economics departments made research-journal and hiring-promotion decisions that 
intentionally (as opposed to being an unintended by-product of dealing with the RAE) lead 
to the three discipline events noted above:  (1) the progressive elimination of heterodox 
economics from research-rated economics departments and from UK economics in general,  
(2) the concentration of economic research in fewer departments and the homogenization of 
                                                          
14
 For example, see Edinburgh’s, Glasgow’s, and Swansea’s 2008 RAE – RA5a:  research 
environment and esteem submissions, available at  http://www.rae.ac.uk/.      
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this research across departments, and (3) the dominance of UK economics by a few elite and 
near-elite departments.  The overall decline in hiring heterodox economists by economics 
departments leading to increasing number of departments with only mainstream economists 
on staff combined with the progressive decline in heterodox submissions to the economics 
RAE panels has created the all-too-accurate impression that economics is a discipline with 
only a single paradigm of mainstream economics.  However, there is more in that 
mainstream economists hold quite punitive attitudes towards heterodox economists and their 
ideas—both are so unacceptable (the former are strictly inferior and mediocre and the latter 
are old and should have been buried long ago) that they should not be part of, not just 
economics, but all of academia.
15
  This is evident in the RAEs where the economics panels 
evaluated heterodox submissions to other RAE panels on the same (negative) grounds that 
they rate their own heterodox submissions.   
 The concentration of research into fewer economics departments is evident along two 
lines:  first is that the number of research rated economics departments declined from 46 to 
28 while the concentration of research funds in the elite and near-elite departments has 
remained over 70 percent since 1996; and the second is that the number of departments with 
post-graduate research students declined from 51 in 1997-98 to 40 in 2010-11 while the 
number of departments with 20 or more research students declined from 30 in 2002-03 to 24 
in 2010-11, and the concentration of research students in the elite and near-elite departments 
                                                          
15
 The terms ‘inferior’ and ‘buried a long time ago’ were mentioned in responses to my 1994 
survey of UK economists (see Lee 2009A: 165, 168); terms which are similar to the assertion of 
‘mediocrity of heterodox economists’ made by Richard Portes (2008: 4) in his 2008 RES Annual 
Report of the Secretary-General (which presumably also reflects the RES’s view of heterodox 
economists given the official nature of the report).  Such views are echoed by mainstream 
economists elsewhere, such as at the University of Chicago and Princeton University where 
heterodox economics is equated to astrology, flat-earth theories, or creationism (Alberti 2012: 3-
4).   
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has remained stable at over 50 percent for nearly fifteen years.  In conjunction with this is 
the homogenization of research across departments, as directly evident by the concentration 
of research in the same core areas and using the same theory and methodology, by the 
focusing of publications on the DL journals, and by how economics is ‘officially’ defined  
and what departments teach their students; and indirectly evident by the declining number of 
research-rated (and non-research-rated) departments that conduct non-mainstream research, 
publish in heterodox journals, and take a pluralist approach towards the teaching of 
economics.  Lastly, the dominance of UK economics the 13 elite and near-elite departments 
is not just in terms of QR funding and the numbers of research staff and research and first 
degree students, but also in terms of the roles they play in the RES and RAE.  Their (that is 
the departments qua assessors) connections with the RES is well-documented and common 
knowledge.  Moreover, they are, for over the four RAEs and the 2014 REF, increasingly 
connected with the ESRC (Table 8 and Appendix X) whose funding of research projects is 
becoming an increasingly important factor when assessing departments.
16
  But what is most 
striking is these departments through their assessors have dominated the RAE panels 
(especially when the obligatory one new university, one Wales, and two Scotland assessors 
are taken into account).  This is especially evident for the 2014 REF panel where nine  
assessors come from the elite and near-elite departments.  So given their RES, ESRC, and 
RAE-REF connections in conjunction with the DL journal editor connection (see Table 8 
and Appendix X), the elite and near-elite departments have turned the assessment exercises 
into a self-promotion activity where those ‘other’ lower-class departments are marginalized. 
                                                          
16The ESRC is also not neutral with regard to heterodox economics.  For example, when 
appointing members of its Peer Review College for the area of economics, not a single heterodox 
economist was appointed (http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/governance/committees-
networks/peer-review-college/index.aspx).  
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6. Conclusion:  The More the RSE Changes the More it Stays the Same 
 
 With the going concern model of UK economics in place, the 2014 REF selectivity 
exercise will reinforce the aforementioned discipline events.  This is evident in the selection 
of the economics assessors which mostly come from elite and near-elite departments and are 
(or have been) managing/associate editors of DL journals (including the Economic Journal).  
That is, in July 2010 the HEFCs asked subject associations to nominate candidates for the 
various subject sub-panels for the 2014 REF; the HEFCs also stated that the criteria for 
appointing assessors included “the diversity of the research community in the relevant fields 
should be reflected in the sub-panel membership” (REF 2010: 7 paragraph 55f).  The 
Association for Heterodox Economics nominated several heterodox economists, but none 
were appointed.  So when querying the HEFC of England about the issue of paradigmatic 
diversity, the response was that “sub panel diversity will not specifically include 
paradigmatic diversity but in forming the expert panels expertise will be sought so as to 
cover the various approaches to all the disciplines” (Gordge, 2010).  This point was further 
pursued with the 2014 REF chair of the economics sub-panel who responded saying that the 
sub-panel does not anticipate a significant volume of submissions that it will be unable to 
assess (Neary, 2011).  Yet, given the professional characteristics of the members of the 
economics sub-panel (see Table 8) and their home departments, it is plausible to conclude 
that the sub-panel’s awareness of paradigmatic diversity does not extend beyond a narrow 
range of mainstream pluralism.  But more to the point, given the ongoing discipline events 
and the long assessment-arm of the economics sub-panel (that stretches across many sub-
panels), it is most likely that heterodox economists will attempt to submit publications  in 
other assessment areas that would hopefully avoid their detection and examination.  So, it 
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could well be that the economics sub-panel will not have to deal with submissions that it is 
unable to assess.
17
 
 There is a further issue concerning the basis of assessment.  The REF’s general 
criteria for assessing submissions is that it must be done so that excellence is applied fairly 
and equally to all forms of research, which the economics sub-panel identifies in terms of 
types of research:  empirical or theoretical, strategic, applied, or policy focused (REF, 2012: 
6, 60, 64).  In addition, the assessment of the submissions is carried out by expert peer 
review, with limited use made of citation data (REF, 2012: 66) and no use made of “journal 
impact factors, ranking or lists, or the perceived standing of the publisher, in assessing the 
quality of research outputs” (REF, 2012: 8).  However, as argued in section 4.3, expert peer 
review as carried out by the assessors is embedded in a set of disciplinary values that are 
represented by DL journals.  So the REF assessment guidelines, by not confronting the issue 
of paradigmatic diversity, permit the ‘indirect’ use of journal rankings and perceived 
standing and obscure it with language denying their use.  This is a clear example of a 
supposedly neutral RSE actually favoring a particular set of discipline values and theory to 
the exclusion of others. 
 What the going concern model illuminates so clearly is the closed, self-referential 
nature of UK economics.  Thus, it is not possible for external criticisms coming from 
marginalized groups to have any real impact, whether it be criticisms of the RAE or the 
impending REF, critical commentary submitted to the International Benchmarking Review 
                                                          
17
 As noted in Table 7 and Appendix VI, heterodox economists qua research have increasingly 
been submitted to the RAE Business and Management Science panel.  However, given the 
dominance of the UK Association of Business Schools’ Academic Journal Quality Guide in 
guiding the identification of research quality in UK business schools, the assessment of 
heterodox research in the forthcoming REF is likely to be the same as that of the economics 
panel (Nedeva, Boden, and Nugroho, 2012).  
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of Economics (Freeman, 2008), problems with the 2000/2007 economics benchmark 
statement, or the shortcomings of peer review as carried out in UK economics (Freeman, 
2011).  Moreover, in due course the marginalized groups are transformed into the ‘other’ 
whose professional activities are considered anti-scientific, anti-mainstream, and outside the 
norms of tolerance and acceptability.  Hence, the model shows how the recursively related 
departments, RES, and the state (as represented by the RAE and HEFCs) have, over the past 
two decades, repressed social qua research activities and the theoretical language specific to 
it (through which the identities of heterodox economists are demonstrated) and debased, 
destroyed, or transformed the organizations and institutions that sustain the activities.  And 
in numerous instances, heterodox economists were faced with loss of professional identify 
and life as an economist if they did not conform.  In short, the going concern model of UK 
economics puts into focus what others have identified as cultural, political, language, or 
social genocide of the ‘other’ (Powell, 2011; Gomez-Suarez, 2007, Levy, 2006; Jacobs, 
2005).  But this is not surprising since the point of the RSE was to reduce the number of 
research universities to 12-15 (Kogan and Hanney 2000:  99); and to ensure that universities 
conduct research carries out teaching that is consistent with the interest of the economic and 
political elite qua the state.  In the period prior to the 1960s, the interests of the state and 
universities were compatible, based on elite homogeneity.  But this fractured in the 1960s and 
1970s, as students and faculty research expressed different interests from the state.  From the 
1980s onwards, effort was spent on resurrecting this common interest via political, 
administrative, bureaucratic means.  In economics this meant that economists needed to produce 
an economics that was more compatible with state interests and this meant, in part, the 
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elimination of the wrong kind of economists and economics.
18
  Whether foreseen or not the 
RSE/RAE became the catalyst through which universities were brought back in line with the 
interests of the state; and in economics it was the key to cleanse economics of ‘wrong’ views, 
homogenize and narrowly focus economic research, and re-establish truly elite departments 
whose views dominate UK economics and elsewhere. 
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Table 1.  Quality Research Funding in Economics, 1992 – 2013 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
     1992  1996  2001
1
  2008 
 
Percentage of Universities  59.2  47.3  35.9  40.1 
with QR Funding (average) 
 
Percentage of QR Funding 
Going to the Top 3 Research  96.2  92.2  100.0  99.4 
Rating Categories 
 
Ratio between the Highest 
And Lowest Funding per   4.3  5.1  4.0  5.6 
Capita          
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  Derived from Appendix II and Appendix V. 
 
1
Universities with a research rating of 3a received QR funding for only 2002-03.  Thus the 
remaining six years are used to calculate the figures in this column. 
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Table 2.  Stratification and Migration of Research Quality of Economics Department 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Stratification 
 
Elite Class  Near-Elite Class Middle Class  Working Class  
 
LSE   Nottingham  Kent   London Metropolitan 
UCL   Bristol   Leicester  Kingston 
Warwick  Queen Mary   Birkbeck  Manchester Metropolitan 
Oxford   Cambridge  Surrey 
Essex   Manchester  Sheffield 
   Southampton  York 
   Royall Holloway Birmingham 
   Exeter   East Anglia 
      Sussex 
      City 
      Brunel 
      Loughborough 
 
Possible Migration 
 
Middle to Near- Non-Research to  Non-Research to  
Elite Class  Middle Class  Working Class 
 
Birkbeck  Durham  Keele 
York   Liverpool   
     Reading   
     Newcastle 
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Table 3.  Diamond List Journals and the RAE 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
     1992 1992
1
  1996
2
  2001  2008 
 
All Submissions   1842 840  3017  2789  2601 
with QR Funding   
 
 
Percentage of Journals   53 60  62  89  91 
Articles of all Submissions     
 
Percentage of Diamond List 
Articles of All Submissions   na 18  na  28  39 
 
Percentage of Diamond List 
Articles of all Journal Articles na 31  na  32  44 
Submitted 
 
Spearman/Pearson Correlation    
of the percentage of Diamond   na rs = .74  na  rs = .78  r = .88  
List Articles and Department   
Research Quality Rating 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  Derived from Appendix IV and the 1992 and 1996 Research Assessment Exercise 
Database (http://www.rae.ac.uk/1992/index.html; 
http://www.rae.ac.uk/1996/database/index.html).  
 
1
From the third column in Appendix IV 
2
The data set does not include Nottingham Trent University. 
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Table 4.  Distribution of Post-graduate Research and First Degree Economics Students, 1994-
95 to 2010-11 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Total Number (and Total Number (and Total Number (and Total Number 
  %) of Research %) of Research %) of First Degree (and %) of  
  Students in the Students in the Students in the top First Degree  
  top two Research Non-Research  two Research   Students in the 
  Rated Departments Rated Departments Rated Departments Non-Research  
           Rated 
           Departments 
 
1994-95  1,185   140   6,445   3,975 
   (69.3)   (8.2)   (36.6)   (22.6) 
 
1997-98  970   280   5,150   5,150 
   (49.7)   (14.4)   (29.2)   (31.2) 
 
2003-04  950   360   6,470   6,200 
   (53.8)   (20.3)   (31.5)   (30.3) 
 
2007-08  725   245   7,105   5,235 
   (55.3)   (18.7)   (35.2)   (25.9) 
 
2010-11  635   205   9,275   8,020 
   (52.7)   (17.0)   (37.9)   (32.8) 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  Derived from Appendix V 
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Table 5.  UK Departments Research Area by Research Ratings:  2001 and 2008 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
          RAE 2001                                          RAE 2008 
 
    5*   5   4   3a/b  Total      5.3-4.5  3.9-3.3  3.2-2.05  1.6-0.8    Total 
Number of Departments    4     9  11     9      33                     5           8           12            3           28 
 
Core Research Areas 
Macroeconomics, Growth     3     8    5    5       21       5       7             9            1           22 
Microeconomics Theory, Game Theory 3     8    4    0       15                     5           5             7            0           17 
Econometrics, Mathematical Economics 2     8    5    4       19                     5           7             6            0           18 
Finance and Monetary Theory  1     4    4    4       13                     3           5             6            1           15 
Development, Transition Economics   2     3    4    3       12                     4           5             6            2           17 
Important Research Areas 
Labor Economics and Industrial Relations     3     4    6    2       15                     4           2             3            0             9 
Industrial Organization, Innovation                3     3    4    3       13                     4           0             5            0             9 
Public Economics and Organizations             2     1    4    2         9                     3           2             1            0             6 
International Economics, Trade, Migration 1     2    2    2         7                     3           1             3            0             7  
Political Economy and Public Policy             0     0    3    1         4                     2           4             2            0             8 
Specialty Research Areas 
Experimental Economics    0     0    3    0         3                     1           2             2            0             5 
Health Economics    0     2    1    2         5                     0           0             4            0             4 
Environmental Economics    1     0    2    0         3                     0           1             1            0             2 
Applied Microeconomics    1     2    0    3         6                     1           2             1            1             5 
Economic History    1     2    0    1         4                     2           2             1            0             5 
Peripheral Research Areas   0     1    4    3         8                     1           3             6            0           10 
Non-Mainstream Research Areas 
Heterodox, Islamic Economics  0     1    1    4         6                     0           0             0            0             0 
History of Economics Thought  0     0    1    1         2                     0           0             0            1             1 
Methodology    0     1    1    0         2                     0           0             0            1             1 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Drawn from the RA5a – Research Environment and Esteem section of the 2001 and 2008 RAE submission:  
41 
 
see http://www.rae.ac.uk/2001/submissions/Inst.asp?UoA=38.  
see http://www.rae.ac.uk/submissions/submissions.aspx?id=34&type=uoa.  
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Table 6.  Department Attitudes in Hiring, Promotion and Journals by Research Rating Category 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Number of  Emphasis on Publishing Exclusive Hiring Hiring and Promotion  Emphasis Redirection  
  Universities in Journals Identified  of Mainstream  based on Potential for  of Research to fit  
    As Blue Ribbon,   Economists   Publishing in Emphasized  better with Diamond  
Diamond List, Core  (Explicit or  Journals, Diamond List List Journals or   
Internationally   Implied)  Journals   shifted to other  
Reputable Journals         Departments 
 
RAE 1992 
 
       5  10   9   10(E)        3 
       4  9   8   8(E)         3 
       3  14   12   12(E)        5 
       2  9   4   3(E)        2 
       1  4   0   2(E)        0 
 
RAE 2001 
 
       5*  4   2   1(I)    2    0 
       5  9   4   4(I)    5    0 
       4  11   6   4(I)    5    2 
       3a/b 9   2   0(I)    0    0 
 
RAE 2008 
 
  5.3-4.5 5   5   5(I)     5    0 
  3.9-3.3 8   6   5(I)    6    0 
  3.2-2.05 12   11   1(I)    3    0 
  1.6-0.8 3   1   0    0    0 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Notes: Drawn from Lee (2009B:  Appendix 21 and 23) and the RA5a – Research Environment and Esteem section of the 2001 and 
2008 RAE submission:  
see http://www.rae.ac.uk/2001/submissions/Inst.asp?UoA=38.  
see http://www.rae.ac.uk/submissions/submissions.aspx?id=34&type=uoa.  
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Table 7.  Location of Heterodox Economics RAE Submissions and Heterodox Economists, 1992 – 2012 
 
   1992 RAE
1
 2001 RAE 2008 RAE Department Location of Heterodox  Number of Number of  
   Heterodox  Heterodox Heterodox Economists Relative to the  Departments Departments 
   Submissions  Submissions Submissions Preceding RAE (in number of without that never had 
   (% of total (% of total (% of total economists)    Heterodox Heterodox 
   submissions) submissions) submissions) ____________________________ Economists Economists 
         1996-2000    2002/3 2012 in 2012 from 1992/6 to 
                2012 
 
Research-Rated       3.2        2.6         1.0        83                 48    33 15 of 28 7 of 28 
Economics      (840)
2
    (2789)
2
     (2604)
2
 
Departments 
 
Non-Research- 
Rated Economics              47       58   45 25 of 40 21 of 40 
Departments 
 
 
Outside of       60.5       82.8      24      48   57 
Economics      (185)
3
     (157)
3 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: Sources:  Appendices IV, VII, and VIII. 
1
 Derived from twenty-one 1992 RAE Economic Departments Publications Submissions Collected by John R. Presely in 
1993-1994. Copies in the possession of the author. 
 
2
Total number of RAE submissions—see Appendix IV. 
 
3
Total number of Heterodox RAE Submissions—see Appendix VII. 
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Table 8.  2001, 2008, and 2014 Economics Panels:  Rae Submissions and Professional 
Characteristics of its Members 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
     2001 RAE 2008 RAE 2014 REF 
         Panel     Panel    Panel
1
 
 
Number of Panel Members         10        10         15    
 
Diamond List Journal          18        21         41 
Submissions 
 
Heterodox Submissions           3          0           0 
 
Total Submissions          38        40         60 
 
Leadership Positions within           9          5           7 
the RES 
 
Managing/Associate Editor           4          4           5 
of The Economic Journal 
 
CHUDE Steering Committee           5          3           2 
 
Managing/Associate Editor of 
a Diamond List Journals (and           1          2           8 
Total Number of Diamond List                  (3)        (6)       (17) 
Journals)  
 
Economics and Social Research          3          2           5 
Council Activities 
 
QAA Economics Benchmarking          4          3           1 
Group 
 
ESRC-RES International           -          1           -  
Benchmarking Review 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  Derived from Appendix X. 
 
1
Panel members’ submissions to the 2008 RAE are used as a ‘proxy’ for their submissions to the 
2014 REF. 
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Figure 1.  Going Concern Model of UK Economics 
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UFC – University Funding Council 
HEFCs – Higher Education Funding Councils (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland) 
RES – Royal Economics Society 
CHUDE – Conference of Heads of University Departments of Economics 
RAE – Research Assessment Exercise 
 
 
 
